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Shen-yi Liao1 and Tamar Szabo´ Gendler2∗
Issues of pretense and imagination are of central interest to philosophers,
psychologists, and researchers in allied fields. In this entry, we provide a roadmap
of some of the central themes around which discussion has been focused. We
begin with an overview of pretense, imagination, and the relationship between
them. We then shift our attention to the four specific topics where the disciplines’
research programs have intersected or where additional interactions could prove
mutually beneficial: the psychological underpinnings of performing pretense
and of recognizing pretense, the cognitive capacities involved in imaginative
engagement with fictions, and the real-world impact of make-believe. In the final
section, we discuss more briefly a number of other mental activities that arguably
involve imagining, including counterfactual reasoning, delusions, and dreaming.
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INTRODUCTION
Issues of pretense and imagination are of cen-tral interest to philosophers, psychologists, and
researchers in allied fields. In this entry, we provide a
roadmap of some of the central themes around which
discussion has been focused.
We begin with an overview of pretense, imagina-
tion, and the relationship between them in the section
entitled Imagination and Pretense. We then shift our
attention to four specific topics where the disciplines’
research programs have intersected or where addi-
tional interactions could prove mutually beneficial:
The Cognitive Underpinnings of Pretense, Recogni-
tion of Pretense, Imaginative Engagement with Fic-
tions, and The Real-World Impact of Make-Believe.
In the final section (Other Roles for the Imagination),
we discuss more briefly a number of other mental
activities that arguably involve imagining, including
counterfactual reasoning, delusions, and dreaming.
IMAGINATION AND PRETENSE
The term ‘imagination’ is a broad one; in this entry,
we focus primarily on the sense required for pretend
play and engagement with fictions. As a first pass,
imagination in this sense is the capacity that underpins
our ability to simulate perspectives that differ from the
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one available to us through experience. Other terms
used to advert to this capacity include ‘make-belief’,1
‘pretense’,2 ‘possible worlds box’,3 and ‘recreative
imagination’.4
Imagination in this sense—recreative imagi-
nation—can be contrasted with sensory imagina-
tion and creative imagination (following Currie and
Ravenscroft4; cf. Strawson5). Roughly, sensory imag-
ination is the capacity to have perception-like expe-
riences in the absence of relevant stimuli; it is often
voluntary, controlled, and willful. Creative imagina-
tion is the capacity to combine ideas in unexpected
and unconventional ways. Although these capacities
may be invoked in pretend play and engagement with
fictions, it is recreative imagination that drives make-
believe activity itself.
Imagination in our sense can also be distin-
guished from a number of related states. Recreative
imaginings have representational content, which is
lacking in (simple) emotions or purely affective states.
And in representing some state of affairs as being
the case, recreative imagining is unlike conative atti-
tudes such as desiring, wanting, wishing, and hoping,
which do not represent their target in that way. (Note,
however, that some philosophers think that an imagi-
native analogue of desire is necessary to explain certain
aspects of pretense; cf. Currie and Ravenscroft4 and
Doggett and Egan.6)
In these respects, recreative imagination is a
belief-like state: indeed, some have argued that imag-
ination and belief share a ‘single code’, in the sense
that the same cognitive mechanisms are employed in
processing both imaginings and beliefs, and beliefs
and imaginings with similar content are processed in
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similar ways.7,8 Despite these similarities, however,
imagination and belief differ in both functional
and normative ways. Functionally, whereas belief is
typically connected, in conjunction with desire, to the
motivation of behavior, imagination is typically not.
Normatively, whereas belief is governed by a norm of
truth, imagination is not. Indeed, to understand what
it is to imagine or pretend may require understanding
that one is not merely believing falsely.9
In the sense just specified, imagination and
pretense are closely tied. Just how closely is
to some extent a terminological matter. Some
(following Ryle10) speak of imagination and pretense
interchangeably; others take imagination to be more
mentalistic and pretense more behavioral. On the
latter reading, most philosophers agree that one could
imagine without pretending, and some contend that
one could pretend without imagining.4
In our discussion below, unless otherwise indi-
cated, we will use the term imagination in its recreative
sense, and the term pretense in its behavioral sense.
THE COGNITIVE UNDERPINNINGS
OF PRETENSEa
In this section, we focus on the (conscious or
unconscious) performance of pretense: we present the
developmental timeline of the underlying ability, say
a few words about the apparent relationship between
pretense and mindreading or theory of mind, and
describe a number of leading theories of pretense.
In the next section, Recognition of Pretense, we
address issues having to do with the recognition (and
indication) of pretense. Though the capacities for per-
formance and recognition are conceptually distinct,
they are closely tied developmentally and cognitively.
Developmental Timeline
Before the middle of their second year—often
by 15 months—typically developing children show
indications of what appears to be make-believe play.
For example, they may act as if an ordinary piece
of cloth were their special bedtime pillow, while
giggling in a playful fashion. (Arguably, instances
of unconscious symbolic representation occur much
earlier—see Piaget.11)
By 22 months, these skills become quite
widespread2,12 and by 24–28 months, most children
are able to participate fully in explicit games of make-
belief—for example, pouring ‘tea’ from an empty
plastic teapot, feeding a toy pig some ‘cereal’ from an
empty bowl, giving a stuffed monkey a ‘banana’ when
there are no (real) bananas in sight, and so on.2,13,14
At the beginning of the third year (24–28
months), four important capacities develop that allow
children to engage in sophisticated joint pretend play
and pretend play involving props. Following Harris,2
these are:
Stipulation-initiation
Pretense content may be generated by stipulations.
(So, for example, blue blocks may be deemed to be
‘cars’ and red blocks to be ‘trucks’.) The mapping
rules between the imaginary scenario and reality
may be instituted by fiat, tend to be spontaneously
extended to related objects, and tend to be episodically
circumscribed (cf. Walton1).
Inheritance of Causal Powers
Many of the causal powers of represented object are
mapped onto the prop. (So, for example, if a blue
block ‘hits’ a ‘tree’, the ‘tree’ will be ‘uprooted’.)
Suspension of Concern for Actual Features
In many cases, the pretend features are taken to over-
ride conflicting actual features: children engaging in
pretense tend to draw inferences from the stipulations
(the teapot is ‘full’ so the counter will become ‘wet’)
rather than from objective features of the world (the
teapot is empty, so no wetness will be transmitted).
Production of Linked Causal Chains
The results of previous pretend transformations may
feed into later transformations. Children engaging in
pretense often construct narratives that include a series
of linked causal chains, demonstrating a capacity to
make a series of inferences based on the pretend causal
properties that the props take on.
During their fourth year, most children develop
the capacity to engage in complex coordinated games
of joint pretense with others.15 By the age of 4,
they have figured out how to keep track of different
individuals simultaneously engaging in different games
of pretense (recognizing, for instance, that if you
pretend the pebbles are apples and I pretend the
pebbles are plums, you will be baking an apple cake
while I am baking a plum cake.15
Because of the near-universality of this develop-
mental trajectory, deviations from it can serve as a
basis for theoretical work regarding pretense’s wider
role. Some of this work is discussed in the next sub-
section in the context of mindreading and autism.
Pretense and Mindreading/Theory of Mind
Mindreading or theory of mind is the activity of
attributing mental states to oneself and to others,
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and of predicting and explaining behavior on the
basis of those attributions. A number of philosophers
and psychologists have suggested that the mechanisms
underlying subjects’ capacity to pretend are the same
ones that allow them to engage in mindreading (see
Refs 3, 4, 7, 16, and 17; for an overview of recent
discussions, see Ref 18). Because pretense requires
imaginatively taking up alternative perspectives, the
same abilities could also contribute to understanding
the actual perspectives of other people. Evidence
from atypical developmental trajectories, particularly
autism, appears to offer empirical support for this
hypothesis: lack of spontaneous pretense in children
on the autistic spectrum tends to be correlated with
deficits in empathy and perspective-taking.4,16,19–21
Early discussions of mindreading were often
framed as debates between the ‘theory theory’
and the ‘simulation theory’. (Influential collections
of papers on this debate include Carruthers and
Smith22 and Davies and Stone.23,24) On theory theory
views, mindreading involves the application of some
(tacit) folk psychological theory that allows the
subject to make predictions and offer explanations
of the target’s beliefs and behaviors (for early
discussions, see Refs 25–27; for overview, see Ref 28).
On simulation theory views, mindreading involves
simulating the target’s mental states so as to
exploit similarities between the subject’s and target’s
processing capacities. It is this simulation that allows
the subject to make predictions and offer explanations
of the target’s beliefs and behaviors. (For early
discussions, see Refs 29–31; for recent dissent, see,
e.g., Refs 18, 32–34; for overview, see Ref 35.)
In recent years, proponents of both sides have
increasingly converged on common ground, allowing
that both theory and simulation play some role in the
attribution of mental states to others. Goldman,16 for
example, argues that while simulation is the primary
means by which the reading of minds is accomplished,
theorizing plays a role in certain sorts of cases as
well. Many recent discussions have endorsed some
such hybrid view, with more or less weight given to
each of the components in particular cases (cf. Refs 3
and 36). On such views, the capacity for recreative
imagination is often held to play a central role in
enabling mindreading.
Theories of Pretense
Theories of pretense fall into three main families.
Metarepresentational views hold that it is the concept
PRETEND that underlies the ability to engage in
pretend play.7,37 Behaviorist views hold that the
ability to engage in pretend play is driven by a process
of behaving-as-if.3,38–40 Intentionalist views hold that
to engage in pretense requires behaving-as-if plus the
intention to do so; people act-as-if rather than behave-
as-if.41,42
Metarepresentational views claim that what is
central to pretense is mentalistic: treating pretense
as such. What underlies the capacity for treating
pretense as such—being able to perform pretense
and recognize pretense—is the possession of the
concept PRETEND. Roughly, to pretend is to rep-
resent one’s own representations, and so the concept
PRETEND applies to metarepresentations. Mechanis-
tically speaking, a decoupler mechanism (described
below) is what allows the formation, manipula-
tion, and interpretation of these metarepresenta-
tions (Ref 7, pp. 419–420). Metarepresentationalism
is often associatedwith its original proponent and con-
tinual defender, Alan Leslie (for example, see Refs 7,
19, 37, and 43).
One initial attraction of the view is that it
explains how the processing of pretense represen-
tations, such as inferring, might utilize the same
mechanisms that are employed in genuine representa-
tions: that is, it offers the promise of a ‘single code’
(Ref 7, p. 417). On this sort of view, subjects have a
decoupler mechanism that extracts the pretense rep-
resentation and allows it to be processed by the same
mechanisms, such as inference, that process genuine
representations. Another initial attraction of the view
is that the same mechanism it proposes for pretense,
the representation decoupler, also explains the rep-
resentational structures necessary for theory of mind
(Ref 7, p. 423). In service of pretense, the decoupler
allows for representations of one’s own representa-
tions, and in service of theory of mind, the decoupler
allows for representations of others’ representations.
Research about autistic children’s simultaneous defi-
ciencies in pretend play and theories of mind gives
further evidence for their common involvement of
metarepresentations.19
A number of the features of Leslie’s account
have been co-opted by subsequent behaviorist views.
For example, Nichols and Stich3 incorporate Leslie’s
idea that belief and imagination operate on a ‘single
code’ and that the same mechanism–for Nichols and
Stich, a possible worlds box rather than Leslie’s
decoupler–underlies the capacity for pretend play and
theory of mind. By incorporating many of Leslie’s
earlier insights, later behaviorist theories are also able
to adequately explain the performance of pretense
and account for many observations of the pretense
developmental trajectory. Gradually, the difference
between the two appears to turn on predictions they
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make about recognition of pretense, which we will
describe in the next section.37,43
Behaviorist views claim that what is central to
pretense is behavioral: behaving ‘as-if’ a scenario
obtains (or rather, behaving in a way that would
be appropriate if that scenario obtained). Which
capacities underlie the ability to behave-as-if is
contentious. Following a categorization initially made
in Ref 38, suppositional views like Perner’s40 and
Nichols and Stich’s3 claim that it is the ability to make
representations with a counterfactual attitude, and
proto-simulationist views like Harris’s2,13 claim that
it is some precursor to the ability of putting oneself in
another’s shoes. Both variants of behaviorism agree,
though, that pretense does not require possessing
the concept PRETEND or the capacity to generate
metarepresentations.
Behaviorists argue that evidence from the same
domains that Leslie focused on—developmental time-
line, relation to theories of mind, and autism—either
does not unambiguously support metarepresenta-
tional views, or in fact better supports their views.38
Overall, the evidence seems to be mixed.
Regarding the developmental timeline, one key
prediction of metarepresentational theories is that solo
pretend play and understanding pretend play in others
should develop at about the same time. As critics
point out, however, the empirical evidence here is
ambiguous.12
With respect to theories of mind, metarepresen-
tational theories seem to predict that theory of mind
and pretend play would develop concurrently given
that the same mechanism, the decoupler, underlies
both. A standard problem for this view has been
that the classic literature on the false-belief task runs
afoul of this prediction. Whereas pretend play begins
around 2 years old, children do not perform well on
verbal tasks that require inferring the beliefs of others
until around 4 years old. In recent years, however, the
classic literature’s claim has been challenged. Studies
that infer children’s understanding of false beliefs from
their gaze patterns rather than from solicited verbal
responses seem to suggest that children develop an
understanding of false beliefs much earlier than pre-
viously thought. Some of this research suggests that
capacity is already present in 15-month-olds, which is
the time whenmake-believe play begins to be observed
(see Refs 44 and 45; for a review, see Ref 46). At the
time of writing, this issue remains unresolved.
Finally, turning to autism, metarepresentation-
alism provides a ready explanation for the cluster of
deficits that typify autistic subjects. But simulation-
ists like Harris2 and Currie and Ravenscroft4 have
given alternative explanations of autistic children’s
simultaneous deficiencies in pretend play and theory
of mind: they attribute simulational deficiency rather
than metarepresentational deficiency to the children,
thereby suggesting that the evidence from that domain
does not tell unambiguously in favor of metarepresen-
tationalism.
Intentionalist views attempt to strike a balance
between metarepresentationalist views and behavior-
ist views. On such accounts, when people pretend
they do not merely behave-as-if, they act-as-if. In
recent psychological literature, Rakoczy et al.42 have
been the main proponents of the intentionalist view
(for an apparent early statement, see Searle,41 p. 65).
On the one hand, intentionalists’ notion of pretense is
more mentalistic than behaviorists’ because it includes
intentionality as an essential component. On the other
hand, this notion is less mentalistic than metarepre-
sentationalists’ because it does not require children
to possess and deploy the concept PRETENSE in
performing and recognizing pretense behaviors.
One of the key findings adduced in favor of the
intentionalist view is that children as young as 2 to
3 years old can distinguish pretense actions from failed
attempts at genuine actions on the basis of recognizing
the intentions behind them.42 To understand this
finding in context, we turn next to discussions about
the recognition of pretense.
RECOGNITION OF PRETENSE
In contrast to issues related to the performance of
pretense, comparatively less attention has been paid
to the recognition of pretense, particularly by philoso-
phers. Two central questions arise in this domain.
First, how do people recognize one another as
pretending? Second, how do people indicate to others
that they are pretending? In this section, we review
the developmental timeline, identify some of the indi-
cators of pretense that aid recognitions, and explore
implications of attending to this aspect of pretense.
Developmental Timeline
Alongside the capacity to perform pretense, the capac-
ity to recognize pretense also develops significantly
during a child’s second year. As pretend play develops
to take on features such as conventional representa-
tions and scripts, children’s understanding of pretense
deepens to include those additions.
Even children as young as 15 months show few
signs of what Alan Leslie has termed ‘representational
abuse’, that is, little indication of coming overtly to
believe that actual-world objects have or will come to
have features of the pretend objects that they serve to
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represent.7 Additional research suggests that children
of this age already have some implicit understanding of
the normativity of pretend games: they show evidence
of comprehending that pretend games have their own
sets of rules that one could conform to or violate.47
By 18 months, many show signs of tracking
rather elaborate games of pretense initiated by
others—for instance, being able to identify which
of two dolls that have been ‘washed’ by an adult
experimenter is ‘still wet’ and engaging in the requisite
‘drying’ activity.14 Children this age are also able to
reliably tell, based on behavioral cues alone, whether
a series of actions are genuine or merely pretend.48
By the age of 3, children are able to articulate
explicitly a number of the differences between real and
pretend—noting, for instance, that a child with a real
dog will be able to see and pet the dog, whereas a child
with a pretend dog will not.2,49,50 They also show a
tendency to actively protest when another participant
violates the conventional norms of the pretend
game.51–53 In the domain of imaginative engagement
with fictions, children this age also begin to express
skepticism about the factuality of fictions, indicating
a capacity to separate fantasy from reality.54,55
Early childhood recognition of pretense appears
to rely primarily on instinctive behavioral cues
common to human and non-human pretend play
(see section on Indicators of Pretense). Later on,
children begin to recognize pretense on the basis
of conventional features. When watching videotaped
behavioral episodes, 4-year-olds show some difficulty
in recognizing pretense behavior, whereas 7-year-olds
recognize pretense behavior as reliably as adults, likely
due to their recognition of stereotyped actions.56 In
the domain of imaginative engagement with fictions,
children between the ages of 3 and 5 begin to develop
understandings of different genre norms, judging
events in realistic (as opposed to fantasy) fictions
as more likely to really happen.55
Indicators of Pretense
To recognize pretense, there must be indicators of pre-
tense that are deployed that could be reliably tracked.
The capacity to recognize and indicate pretense also
exists in non-human animals. Special behavioral cues
have been found to precede play fighting in rats,57
dogs,58 and other canids.59,60 Canids also adopt
stereotyped, shorter-duration actions in play fighting,
which they do not do in genuine fighting.61
In humans, behavioral cues of pretense range
from instinctual to conventionalized. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, explicit verbal cues are rarely used to
indicate that an episode is ‘only pretend’.48 Among
the important features that have been found to
correlate reliably with identification of pretense are
the following:
Gaze
When mothers are only pretending to consume a
snack and a drink, as opposed to genuinely doing so,
they tend to gaze at children for longer durations.48
Direction and duration of gaze also plays a central role
in allowing viewers of videoclips of these episodes
to distinguish pretend from genuine behavior.56 It
appears that even children as young as 18 months
distinguish pretense from authentic behavior through
differences in gaze.47
Smile
The research on smile as an indicator of pretense
has produced mixed findings. Some researchers have
suggested ‘knowing’ smiles after pretense behavior
are strong indicators.11,62 But Richert and Lillard did
not find correlations between patterns of smiles and
identifications of pretense in their videoclips study.56
The mixed evidence may be due to the inherent
difficulty in distinguishing the different kinds of smiles.
Movement
As noted earlier, non-human animals use stereotyped
actions to indicate play fighting. Similar tendencies
are found in humans. For example, when pretending
to eat, one might exaggerate the chewing and do so
more slowly (or quickly). These unusual repetitions
and timings of movements are reliable indicators of
pretense for older children and adults,56 but not for
18-month-olds.48
Sound Effects
Adults and older children both use sound effects
to indicate pretense,63 for example, making ‘vroom
vroom’ sounds when pretending that an object is a car.
However, like other cues on the conventional end of
the spectrum, sound effects are not used by 18-month-
olds to recognize pretense.48 Children as young as 2
and 3 years also have the ability to recognize pretense
from exaggerated speech patterns.64
Implications
The developmental timeline of pretense recognition
and the range of pretense indicators have significant
implications for the debate concerning the cognitive
underpinnings of pretense. An adequate theory of
pretense needs to explain both the performance
aspect and the recognition aspect of pretense
episodes. Evidence from recognition of pretense
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has thus been used to argue for the theories of
pretense reviewed earlier (see section on Pretense and
Mindreading/Theory of Mind).
On the one hand, metarepresentationalists can
argue that their views are preferable on grounds of
theoretical economy: such accounts can explain both
performances of pretense and recognitions of pretense
with the same theoretical resource: the concept
PRETEND. In contrast, they claim, behaviorists—and
intentionalists, who they consider to be a mere variant
of behaviorists—require two distinct mechanisms
for performing and recognizing pretense, with
no clear explanation of the link between them.
Metarepresentationalists also cite the existence of
conventionalized indicators of pretense as evidence in
their favor. Behaviorist views, they claim, have trouble
explaining why the mother making a ‘vroom vroom’
sounds is a way to pretend a pencil is a car. After all,
it is not the pencil that is behaving-as-if it were a car
by making ‘vroom vroom’ sounds, nor is the mother
pretending to be a car. Friedman and Leslie43 reviews
arguments in favor of metarepresentationalist views.
On the other hand, behaviorists can cite the
developmental timeline of pretense recognition capac-
ities as evidence for the centrality of behavior to
pretense. While children typically do not understand
metarepresentations until 4 years old, they are typi-
cally able to recognize pretense on the basis of behav-
ioral cues when they are as young as 2.38,65 Indepen-
dently, behaviorists might argue that metarepresenta-
tionalist views sit uneasily with the ethological data.
Unless one wants to maintain that animals such as rats
possess the concept PRETEND, it is unclear how the
metarepresentational view would explain recognitions
of pretense in animal play fighting. Lillard17 reviews
arguments in favor of behaviorist views.
Finally, intentionalists too can cite as evidence
that children’s understanding of the intentional
structure of human behaviors develops around the
same time as their capacity for recognizing pretense.
As mentioned above, the experiments in Rakoczy
et al.42 show that young children can distinguish
pretense actions from failed attempts at genuine
actions on the basis of their recognition of the
intentions behind them.
Whereas philosophers have been active partici-
pants in the debate over the cognitive underpinnings
of the performance aspect of pretense, the recognition
aspect of pretense has been comparatively neglected
in these discussions. Considering the close relations
between them, much work remains to be done draw-
ing out the philosophical import of the psychological
findings of pretense recognition.
IMAGINATIVE ENGAGEMENT
WITH FICTIONS
When we read books, watch movies, listen to stories,
and participate in other aesthetic experiences, an
important part of our engagement is imagining the
content of the narratives. Indeed, Walton1 has argued
that the same capacity that underlies children’s
make-believe games is also what allows us to have
experiences of aesthetic appreciation, even of non-
narrative arts. Philosophers and psychologists have
investigated how real-world beliefs, attitudes, and
dispositions influence imaginative engagement with
fictions, but largely in isolation. In this section, we
attempt to bring together two such bodies of work:
philosophical work on imaginative resistance and
psychological work on transportation.
Imaginative Resistanceb
In considering the capacities that underlie imaginative
engagements with fictions, philosophers in recent
years have devoted a good deal of attention to the
puzzle of imaginative resistance. The phenomenon,
imaginative resistance, occurs when a subject finds
it difficult or problematic to engage in some sort of
prompted imaginative activity. Suppose, for example,
that you were confronted with a variation ofMacbeth
where ‘the facts of [Duncan’s] murder remain as they
are in fact presented in the play, but it is prescribed
in this alternate fiction that this was unfortunate only
for having interfered with Macbeth’s sleep’.66 If you
found it difficult to imagine this, even though the
author had done everything that usually done to
make such a story fictionally true, then you would
be experiencing imaginative resistance.
While early discussions of imaginative resis-
tance, such as Walton67, tended to focus on exam-
ples (like the one above) involving ‘morally deviant’
worlds, it is now widely agreed that this initial char-
acterization was too restrictive (for partial dissent,
see Gendler68). In more recent literature, the term is
typically applied to any sort of case where subjects
find it unexpectedly difficult to (bring themselves to)
imagine what an author describes, or to accept such
a claim as being true in the story. So, for exam-
ple, Weatherson69 has argued that resistance puzzles
arise not only for normative concepts (including thick
and thin moral concepts, aesthetic judgments, and
epistemic evaluations), but also for attributions of
mental states, attributions of content, and even claims
involving constitution or ontological status.
As Walton70 notes, the questions addressed
under the rubric of imaginative resistance turn out
to be a ‘tangled nest of importantly distinct but
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easily confused puzzles’. Indeed, Weatherson69 has
argued that there are at least four such puzzles. The
phenomenological puzzle is the puzzle of why certain
passages tend to evoke a particular phenomenology,
sometimes described as ‘pop-out’or ‘doubling of the
narrator’.68,71 The imaginability puzzle is the puzzle
of why, in certain cases, readers display a reluctance
or inability to engage in some mandated act of
imagining, so that typical invitations to make-believe
are insufficient. The fictionality puzzle is the puzzle of
why, in certain cases, the default position of authorial
authority breaks down, so that mere authorial say-so
is insufficient to make it the case that something is true
in a story. And in its most general form, the aesthetic
value puzzle is the puzzle of why, in certain cases,
texts that evoke other sorts of imaginative resistance
are thereby aesthetically compromised.
In the discussion below, we will concentrate
on the phenomenology and the imaginability puzzles,
as they are most closely tied to the psychology of
participating in make-believe with fictions (see section
on Exploring Connections below.)
Transportation
A number of psychologists interested in the capacities
that underlie imaginative engagement with fiction
have explored the phenomenon through the concept
of transportation. To be transported is, roughly, to
feel immersed in a fictional world, so much so that
the real world temporarily ceases to feel accessible.
One might think of it as the opposite of imaginative
resistance. A similar feeling of transportation may
arise in episodes of pretense (Velleman72 and Doggett
and Egan6 discuss the feeling of being immersed in
pretense).
Transportation theory has its origins in Gerrig,73
and is elucidated in detail in Green and Brock.74 On
their account, transportation is ‘a distinct mental pro-
cess, an integrative melding of attention, imagery, and
feelings’.74 To be transported, readers must let their
imaginings be phenomenologically dominant, trigger
mental imagery, and cause emotional responses. In the
scale that Green and Brock have developed to measure
the extent to which readers are transported, all three
components—cognitive, affective, and imagery—are
measured. While their initial experiments focused on
short, written narratives, Green and Brock74 make it
clear that transportation theory is intended to apply
across engagements with fictions of different forms.
Later works by Dal Cin et al.75 and Rowe Stitt and
Nabi76 take up this task and extend the theory to
cases of film.
Psychologists have identified a number of factors
that influence the extent to which an appreciator is
transported. Generally speaking, consistency between
an appreciator’s prior belief and what is true in the
fiction positively correlates with greater transporta-
tion into those fictional worlds,77 whereas stories in
which real-world associations are violated tend to
produce initial transportational difficulties.78 There
are also individual differences among subjects, with
individuals showing greater or lesser tendencies to
become immersed in a wide range of circumstances;
these differences can be measured using Dal Cin
et al.’s75 transportability scale. There is also prelimi-
nary evidence suggesting that genre familiarity could
be another important factor in affecting transporta-
tion among subjects, particularly those with relatively
high transportability79
Exploring Connections
Although a number of recent discussions of resistance-
related phenomena draw on related work in cognitive
and social psychology,8,80–82 work on transportation
has largely been ignored. One way to connect the two
phenomena, as suggested earlier, is to see imaginative
resistance as an extreme case of being not transported
at all. If so, there may be useful connections to
be drawn between the two bodies of work. The
cognitive component of the transportability scale
contains items such as ‘While I was reading the
narrative, I could easily picture the events in it
taking place’.74 Although Green and Brock do not
use the same terms as the philosophers, they appear
to be interested in the comparative ease to which the
consumer of the narrative could imagine the events
taking place. In addition to the cognitive component,
transportation also includes affective and imagery
components. In contrast, the discussion of imaginative
resistance appears to place relatively little emphasis
on these aspects of people’s experiences when
imaginative engaging with narratives. Diving deeper
into these aspects of imaginative resistance might
enrich philosophers’ discussion of the phenomenon.
On the other hand, psychologists could also
deepen their understanding of transportation by
borrowing a distinction from philosophers. The
psychologists who have studied transportation theory
have focused largely on the impact that beliefs,
attitudes, and dispositions have on imagining certain
descriptive propositions. Philosophers, on the other
hand, have focused attention on fictional normative
claims, such as that female infanticide is justified,
because of the problems they pose for imaginative
engagement with fictions. Given this important
distinction made in philosophy, it seems worthwhile
for psychologists to gather empirical results on how
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people respond to moral and other normative claims
in fiction, which may differ from their responses to
descriptive claims.
THE REAL-WORLD IMPACT
OF MAKE-BELIEVE
Having briefly reviewed how real-world beliefs,
attitudes, and dispositions impact make-believe, we
will now consider the reverse: the real-world impact of
pretense and imaginative engagement with fictions. As
before, philosophers, psychologists, and researchers in
allied fields have longstanding interest in this topic,
but have worked largely in isolation. In this section,
we attempt to bring together the research on fiction’s
role in moral education and on the effects that fictions
have on beliefs, attitudes, and dispositions.
Fiction’s Role in Moral Education
Since ancient times, philosophers and others have
argued that fiction can play a role in the moral
education of those who imaginatively engage with
it, that is, in the development of their abilities to think
and act in morally desirable ways.
On the surface, this claim faces obvious
epistemological worries. Carroll84 summarizes three
lines of purported arguments against aesthetic
cognitivism—the view that we can gain knowledge
from imaginatively engaging with fictions. The
banality argument charges that even if we could
gain knowledge from fictions, the scope would be
limited to truths that are banal or already known.
The no-evidence argument objects that artworks are
unsuitable evidence for drawing general inferences.
The no-argument argument points out that fictions,
by their very nature, do not provide arguments or
justifications for the claims they assert.
To circumvent worries posed by these argu-
ments, Carroll,84 Currie,85 Jacobson,86 Johnson,87
Mullin,88 Nussbaum,89 and Robinson90 have
proposed various subtly different versions of aesthetic
cognitivism that focuses less on beliefs and more on
emotions and implicit attitudes. They suggest that
fictions can play a role in moral education by allowing
imaginative acquaintance with unfamiliar moral
perspectives and emotions, and cultivate existing
moral understanding and capabilities by creating and
directing the reader’s attention to novel situations to
which that understanding can be applied.
For Nussbaum, to take one example, an
important skill in the moral domain is the ability to
discern morally salient features of one’s situation. This
skill, she argues, is the one that must be developed,
and one to which the engagement with literature might
effectively contribute by providing ‘close and careful
interpretative descriptions’ of imagined scenarios
that enable emotional involvement untainted by
distorting self-interest.89 Hakemulder91 reviews some
psychological evidence for this hypothesis.
Effects of Fictions on Beliefs, Attitudes,
and Dispositions
Although psychologists and researchers from com-
munication and media studies have not specifically
focused on the dimension of morality, they have
investigated the effects that imaginatively engaging
with fictional narratives have on people’s beliefs, atti-
tudes, and dispositions (for a broad review, see Brock
et al.92).
In considering the effects that narratives have
on one’s beliefs, let us start with an example before
discussing the mechanisms that underly these effects
and the scope of these effects. In a study reported
in Green,77 participants read Lynn Harris’s short
story ‘Just as I am’ that describes, from a first-
person perspective, a gay man’s experience returning
to his old fraternity for a reunion and encountering
homophobia. After reading the story, participants
responded, among others, to statements that relate to
homophobia in fraternities. Participants who reported
being more transported into the fiction also showed
a tendency to agree more strongly with claims about
the real world that are consistent with the story, such
as ‘people in fraternities are homophobic’, even when
prior attitudes and experiences were controlled for.
Likewise, Prentice et al.93 found that partic-
ipants who read factually-false statements in the
context of a fictional narrative—statements such as
‘sunlight is good for your skin’ and ‘most forms of
mental illness are contagious’—are more inclined to
believe them to be true in the real world. Other
research suggests that the same narrative can influ-
ence readers’ beliefs as much when it is labeled as a
fictional television drama script as when it is labeled
as news broadcast transcript94 (see also Marsh et al.95
for similar findings).
What mechanisms could explain how fictions,
even when recognized as such, influence our beliefs
about the real world? One factor is the effect of mere
exposure to information. Existing findings show that
people’s default psychological toward information is
belief, and that it takes additional effort to ‘unbelieve’
information that has been processed.96,97 As such,
exposure to content, even in an explicitly fictional
context, may strengthen one’s beliefs about it,74,77,93
perhaps because when imaginatively engaging with
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fictions, people tend not to engage in critical
processing of the information presented, showing
indifference to its source.74,95
More empirical evidence is needed to specify the
scope of the influence that fictions have on people’s
beliefs about the real world. Fictions might only be
able to exert influence people’s beliefs when people are
not attentive to this possibility. Shrum et al.98 found
that participants who were primed to think of televi-
sion as a possible influence on their beliefs about the
prevalence of crime and of certain occupations experi-
enced less change to their beliefs compared with par-
ticipants who were not so primed. Explicit warnings
may also encourage critical processing of information
in fictions. Pechmann and Shih99 found that while pos-
itive depictions of smoking in films tend to increase
youth’s intent to smoke, this effect is nullified by an
explicit anti-smokingmessage appearing before a film.
Although these studies begin to map out the
scope of fiction’s influence, other questions remain
open. First, which fictions can influence people’s
beliefs about the real world? Clearly, people would
not believe in the existence of dragons even after being
exposed to such information in a fantasy story. Given
that all the stories that have been used as stimuli tend
to be realistic fictions, more research is needed on the
effect of different genres. (For preliminary work in
this area, see Ref 79.) Second, which beliefs are more
prone to be influenced by information presented in
fictions? Given that all the statements that experiment
participants have been asked to respond to are descrip-
tive, one naturally wonders (especially given the phe-
nomenon of imaginative resistance discussed earlier),
whether the results generalize to evaluative statements
(see section on Exploring Connections below.)
The precise extent to which fictions influence
people’s attitudes and dispositions is also controver-
sial. One area where considerable attention has been
devoted to is the effect of exposure to imaginary
violence. Earlier studies claiming that exposure to
violence in media results in an overall distrustful atti-
tude toward the real world (e.g., Gerbner et al.100) has
been criticized on methodological grounds.101 Recent
evidence suggests that fictions do influence attitudes
and dispositions, albeit in limited ways. For example,
Williams102 found that when participants are exposed
to armed robbery in a video game, their assessment of
the likelihood of armed robbery occurring in the real
world increases; however, their attitudes toward other
violent crimes, such as physical assault, rape, andmur-
der remain unchanged. This suggests that attitudinal
and dispositional changes brought on by imaginatively
engaging with fictions may be circumscribed.
Exploring Connections
In thinking about the implications of the empirical
research on the effects of fictions on beliefs, attitudes,
and dispositions for philosophical theorizing, it may
be helpful to think about its consequences for
various versions of aesthetic cognitivism—the view
that we can gain knowledge from imaginatively
engaging with fictions. Contemporary philosophers
who work on explaining how fictions may play a
role in moral education (discussed earlier in section
on Fiction’s Role in Moral Education), such as
Martha Nussbaum, have tried to sidestep traditional
epistemological worries with aesthetic cognitivism
by focusing on fictions’ influences on attitudes
and dispositions rather than their influences on
beliefs. Consider Nussbaum’s proposal that fiction’s
contribution to moral education is that it allows us
to examine imagined scenarios without distortions
of self-interest, and thus improve on our skills of
discerning morally salient features of a situation.
An assumption appears to be that practice noticing
morally salient features in particular fictional situation
can indeed improve one’s ability to notice morally
salient features generally in real-world situations.
However, this assumption called into question by
the empirical findings suggesting that attitudinal and
dispositional changes brought on by imaginatively
engaging with fictions may not generalize well from
the specific fictional situations encountered. Further
empirical investigation is warranted.
At the same time, psychology and allied fields
could benefit from interactions with the rich philo-
sophical literature on moral education. Few studies
concerning the impact of fiction have focused explic-
itly on moral (as opposed to descriptive or merely
social-conventional) beliefs, attitudes, and disposi-
tions. Looking into themoral and otherwise evaluative
aspects of fictions could help clarify the scope of
fiction’s influence, as well as potentially informing us
about the underpinnings of moral psychology.
OTHER ROLES FOR
THE IMAGINATIONc
Thus far, we have focused on a number of
paradigmatic roles of the imagination, in particular,
its roles in allowing us to participate in pretense and
engage with fictions and other representational arts.
However, the imagination may also be implicated in
other facets of our mental lives: in counterfactual
reasoning, delusions, and dreaming. Attending to
philosophical and psychological research in these
areas allows us to better understand the fundamental
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nature of the imagination and its role in the human
cognitive architecture, and consequently gives us a
more complete picture of its involvement in pretense.
Counterfactual Reasoning
Pre-theoretically, people tend to think of imagination
as free-flowing and without guidance—the opposite
of ‘rational thinking’. Considering imagination’s role
in evaluating counterfactuals, however, demonstrates
that constrained imagination plays a central role in
everyday reasoning about possibilities.
Timothy Williamson, for example, suggests that
‘When we work out what would have happened
if such-and-such had been the case, we frequently
cannot do it without imagining such-and-such to be
the case and letting things run’ (Williamson,103 p. 19;
cf. Williamson104). On this sort of account, if Juliet
thinks to herself, ‘If only the messenger had reached
him with the news, Romeo would still be alive’, it is
Juliet’s imagining a relevant situation in which Romeo
does not believe that she is actually dead that allows
her to move from the antecedent to the consequent
of the counterfactual conditional that she entertains.
Clearly, such contemplation gives access to a suitably
circumscribed set of worlds only if the imaginative
exercise is somehow constrained with respect to what
is held constant.
In considering how to apply truth-valuation to
counterfactual conditionals, philosophers have implic-
itly given guidelines on how imagination ought to be
constrained in counterfactual reasoning. On the clas-
sic account of counterfactual conditionals developed
by Stalnaker105 and Lewis,106,107 a counterfactual
A[] → C is true if and only if in the closest possible
world where A is true and C is also true. (One differ-
ence between them is that while Stalnaker assumes
that there is always a unique closest world in a
given context, Lewis does not.) Accordingly, when
we imagine in aid of counterfactual reasoning, our
imaginings should be constrained to possible worlds
that minimize departures from reality. A great deal of
philosophical discussion has been devoted to specify-
ing what these constraints amount to. (For reviews of
some of these issues, see section 5 of Edgington108 and
section 6 of Arlo-Costa.109)
The question of what tends to be held constant
when subjects contemplate counterfactual scenarios
has been explored in detail in recent empirical
psychological work. (Cf. Johnson-Laird110 and essays
collected in Roese and Olson.111) In her monograph-
length discussion of the role of imagination in
counterfactual reasoning, Ruth Byrne112 presents
evidence showing that when people reason using
counterfactuals, their imaginings tend to follows
certain patterns which she calls ‘faultlines in reality’.
For example, people tend not to imagine worlds with
different natural laws, and they tend to imagine alter-
natives to more recent as opposed to earlier events,
alternatives to actions as opposed to inactions, and
alternatives to events that were within their control as
opposed to events outside of it. Clearly, some of the
‘faultlines’ that Byrne proposes share strong affinities
with constraints that philosophers like Lewis and
Stalnaker have proposed. These ‘faultlines’ are also
evident in what people include in the construction
of fictional worlds.113 However, Rafetseder et al.114
present evidence that suggest children up to 6 years
old do not consistently employ the nearest-possible-
world model in counterfactual reasoning. (For an
overview of additional work in psychology in this
area, see section III of the survey inMarkman et al.115)
Delusions
Delusions can be characterized, roughly, as belief-
like mental representations that manifest an unusual
degree of disconnectedness from reality. Delusions are
problematic to categorize because they seem to exhibit
features of both belief and imagination. One striking
example of a delusion is Capgras syndrome, where
the sufferer takes her friends and family to have been
replaced by imposters. As Egan116 points out, while a
person who suffers from Capgras delusion might act
differently toward their friends and family as a result
(the delusion thus can motivate like belief), she might
not draw all the inferences on her overall worldview
that her delusional thoughts demand (the delusion
thus is circumscribed like imagination). Given its
imagination-like features, attending to delusions give
us a different insight into the role that imagination
and pretense play in our cognitive architecture.
A natural way to characterize delusions is
as beliefs that are in some way dysfunctional
or, alternatively, as beliefs that are formed in a
dysfunctional way. (For a representative collection of
papers that present and criticize this perspective, see
Coltheart and Davies117). Currie and Ravenscroft,4
however, have argued that delusions are often
disorders of the imagination (pp. 170–175). On their
account, delusions should be understood as involving
a deficit in the subject’s ability to distinguish between
what is imagined and what is believed. Relating back
to theories of pretense, delusions appear to involve a
deficit in the capacity to recognize pretense as such.
Other philosophers take delusions to present
difficulties for a clear-cut theoretical divide between
belief and imagination. On Gendler’s account,118,119
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delusionsmay occur when imaginings come to play the
role of belief in one’s cognitive economy. On Andy
Egan’s account,116 delusions should be understood
as ‘bimaginations’, that is, as something in between
beliefs and imaginings.
Dreaming
As is the case with delusions, it is difficult to
categorize the mental states involved in dreams.
Whether dreaming involves imagining or believing
has wider philosophical implications. In epistemology,
Descartes famously used the fact that we often dream
without recognizing it to motivate an argument for
external-world skepticism. An implicit premise in
the Cartesian skeptic’s argument is that dreaming
involves beliefs that indistinguishable from normal
beliefs about the external world.
More recently, however, philosophers and psy-
chologists have appealed to imagination to charac-
terize dreaming. For example, philosopher Walton1
describes dreams as ‘spontaneous, undeliberate imag-
inings’, and psychologist David Foulkes characterizes
dreaming as ‘the awareness of being in an imagined
world in which things happen’ (p. 9).120 By consider-
ing the differences between the dream mental states
and normal beliefs, such as their relations to percep-
tual experience and actions, Ichikawa121 contends that
the mental states involved in dreams are not beliefs,
but imaginings. The epistemological implications of
characterizing dreaming by appealing to imagination
have been a source of dispute. Sosa122,123 claims and
Ichikawa121 denies that this reconstrual fully blunts
the force of the Cartesian dreaming argument.
However, as John Sutton’s survey article on
dreaming124 points out, the topic of dreaming has been
relatively neglected in philosophy of mind in general,
including the literature on imagination. One exception
is the book-length treatment in Flanagan125 that
examines the nature and function of dreams. Given
its interest for imagination’s role in our cognitive
architecture and wider philosophical implications,
the topic of dreaming merits further theoretical and
empirical investigation.
CONCLUSION
Numerous points of connection exist between philo-
sophical and psychological work on pretense, some
relatively well-explored, others in need of further
investigation. In this entry, we have identified some of
the areas on which the research programs do or could
overlap, including performing and recognizing pre-
tense (see sections on The Cognitive Underpinnings
of Pretense and Recognition of Pretense), imaginative
engagement with fiction (see section on Imaginative
Engagement with Fictions), the real-world impact of
make-believe (see section on The Real-World Impact
of Make-Believe), and counterfactual reasoning, delu-
sions, and dreaming (see section on Other Roles for
the Imagination).
Along the way, we have made suggestions on
future research, especially where greater interdisci-
plinary interactions can be fruitful. Let us briefly recap
these suggestions:
• Increasingly, debates between theories of pretense
turn on their ability to account for children’s
recognition of pretense. Although philosophers
have been actively involved in the research on the
performance aspect of pretense, the recognition
aspect of pretense has been comparatively
neglected. Much work remains on drawing out
the philosophical import of the psychological
findings of pretense recognition.
• In discussions of imaginative resistance, philoso-
phers have focused primarily on difficulties with
propositional imagination. Drawing a parallel
between philosophical research on imaginative
resistance and psychological research on trans-
portation, however, reveals that philosophers’
discussions can be enriched by attending to
the affective and imagery aspects of people’s
experiences.
• Theories of moral education implicitly make
commitments regarding how imaginatively
engaging with fictions can influence people’s
morally relevant beliefs, attitudes, and
dispositions. On the theoretical side, philoso-
phers can do more in making explicit the
psychological commitments of various theories.
On the empirical side, findings about the mecha-
nisms and the scope of fictions’ impact on people
can contribute to assessing the plausibility of
theories, once their psychological commitments
are made explicit.
• Psychological research on transportation and
fictions’ impact on people have focused primarily
on realistic fictions and on descriptive propo-
sitions. Philosophical research on imaginative
resistance and moral education, however,
suggests that existing psychological findings may
not generalize to fictions of other genres and
to evaluative propositions. A diverse range of
stimuli could help researchers gain an even richer
understanding of these phenomena.
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• Research on counterfactual reasoning reveals
interesting patterns of imaginings that people
tend to employ. Recent results suggest that the
same patterns are also evident in the construction
of make-believe worlds. A better understand-
ing of imagination’s involvement in pretend play
and engagement with fictions may result from
attending to imagination’s involvement in coun-
terfactual reasoning.
• Delusions and dreams provide interesting chal-
lenges to understanding the nature of imagi-
nation and its place in cognitive architecture.
The involvement of imagination in dreaming
has been especially neglected. Responding to
these challenges can further our understanding
of the capacities that underwrite pretend play
and engagement with fictions.
NOTES
aDiscussion in this section draws on Gendler.126,127
bDiscussion in this section draws on Gendler.128
cThis section draws on Gendler.126
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